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This paper uses both a global and local perspective to assess the impacts of climate change on the Yemeni 
economy, agriculture, and household income and food security. The major impact channels of climate 
change are through changing world food prices as a result of global food scarcities, long-term local yield 
changes as a result of temperature and rainfall variations, and damages and losses of cropland, fruit trees, 
livestock, and infrastructure as a result of natural disasters such as recurrent storms and floods. Moreover, 
spatial variation in climate change impacts within Yemen means that such effects can vary across 
subnational regions. We develop a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model 
with six agroecological zones to capture linkages between climate change, production, and household 
incomes. We also capture changes in per capita calorie consumption in response to changing household 
expenditure for assessing changes in people’s hunger situation as a measure for food security. Given the 
high uncertainty surrounding future global food prices and local yields, all simulations are run under two 
global climate scenarios. 
The results of the CGE simulations suggest that climate-change-induced higher global prices for 
food will lower Yemen’s overall GDP growth, raise agricultural GDP, decrease real household incomes, 
and increase the number of hungry people. Local impacts of climate change are different for the two 
climate scenarios. Overall, the long-term implications of climate change (local and global) lead to a total 
accumulated reduction of household welfare of between US$5.7 and $9.2 billion by 2050 under MIR or 
CSI conditions, respectively. Moreover, between 80,000 and 270,000 people could go hungry due to 
climate change. Rural households are harder hit than urban households, and among the rural households 
the non-farm households suffer most. This household group is projected to lose an accumulated 3.5 to 5.7 
billion US$ as a consequence of longer term climate change by 2050. In addition to the longer-term 
climate change effects, climate variability is shown to induce heavy economic losses and spikes in food 
insecurity. The impact assessment of the October 2008 tropical storm and floods in the Wadi Hadramout 
puts the total cumulated real income loss over the period 2008-12 at 180 percent of pre-flood agricultural 
value added. Due to the direct flood loss, farmers in the flooding areas suffer most in the year of the flood 
occurrence, where the percentage of hungry people living from farming spiked by about 15 percentage 
points as an immediate result of the flood. 
Action to mitigate the negative effects of climate change and variability should to be taken on the 
global and local level. A global action plan for improving food security combined with a better 
integration of climate change in national development strategies, agricultural and rural policies, and 
disaster risk management and social protection policies will be keys for improving the resilience of 
Yemen and Yemenis to climate change. 
Keywords:  Yemen, Middle East and North Africa, climate change, flood, food security, hunger, 
development, growth  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Climate change affects countries’ economies and food security through a variety of channels. Rising 
temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns affect agricultural yields of both rainfed and irrigated crops. 
The unchecked rise of sea levels leads to loss of land, landscape, and infrastructure. A higher frequency of 
droughts may impair hydropower production and an increase in floods can significantly raise public 
investment requirements for physical infrastructure (Stern 2006; World Bank 2007; Garnaut 2008; Yu, 
Thurlow, et al. 2010; Yu, Zhu, et al. 2010). Such sector-level impacts will have knock-on effects on other 
sectors and thus influence economic growth, food security, and household incomes. 
The global economic effects of climate change also affect individual countries through changes in food 
supply, trade flows, and commodity prices (Nelson et al. 2010; Breisinger et al. 2011). For example, 
Nelson et al. (2009, 2010) project that global food prices are bound to increase substantially as a 
consequence of continued high global population growth, changing food consumption patterns, and 
climate change. Taking higher food prices into consideration is therefore important for any climate 
change impact assessment at the country level. Depending on the net import or export position of 
countries and the net producing and consuming status of households of specific commodities affected, the 
agricultural sector, household incomes, and food security are likely to be affected differently. 
For Yemen, both global and local climate change impacts are likely to matter for future 
development, given the country’s high levels of food import dependency, food insecurity, and poverty. 
Yemen imports between 70 and 90 percent of cereals and is a net importer of many other food items 
(Ecker et al. 2010). Yemen is also the poorest country in the Arab world, with an estimated 43 percent of 
its people living in poverty, and is among the most food-insecure countries in the world, with 32 percent 
of the population hungry, that is, without access to enough food (Breisinger et al. 2010; Ecker et al. 
2010). Rural–urban inequalities are high. The number of food-insecure people living in rural areas, at 
37.3 percent, is more than five times higher than in urban areas (17.7 percent) (Ecker et al. 2010). Within 
rural areas, rural nonfarm households have higher food-insecurity rates than farm households. 
The ongoing uprising is hitting the Yemeni economy and the poor hard. Although no recent 
estimates exist to date, it is clear that sharp declines in oil exports, foreign aid, and tourism plus double-
digit inflation since the beginning of 2011 have further increased the number of poor and food-insecure 
people. Climate change may add to the already huge development challenges that Yemen is facing, 
including the lack of job-creating growth within the oil-dependent economic structure, a distorted 
economic incentive system coupled with an inefficient social transfer system, rapidly depleting oil and 
water resources, and the growing production and consumption of qat, a mild narcotic. 
A post revolution Yemen may provide a huge opportunity for urgently needed reform of 
economic strategies and policies. In recent years, a number of reform initiatives have emerged, most of 
which have been implemented only partially and with significant delays. Advice from the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank on preparing for the transition to a non-oil economy has had limited 
traction, particularly in the context of record world oil prices and increasing political and security 
constraints. However, the sharp decline in oil output since 2007 and the global food crises in 2007–2008 
and 2010–2011 have triggered several policy initiatives, including a National Food Security Strategy, 
developed jointly by the National Food Security Committee and the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI). 
Against this background, this paper assesses how far climate change is likely to affect Yemen and 
thus needs to be considered in future development strategies. It focuses on the impacts of climate change 
on agriculture and household-level food security (taking economywide effects into consideration) and the 
effects of rising global food prices between 2011 and 2050. The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 presents the analytical and empirical framework of the study and describes each of its 
components. Section 3 presents the results of the local, global, and combined climate change impact 
assessment, and Section 4 analyzes the effects of floods. Section 5 concludes with recommendations for 
climate change adaptation action.  
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2.  ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
Global Impacts: IFPRI IMPACT Model 
The challenge of modeling climate change impacts arises in the wide-ranging nature of processes that 
underlie the working of markets, ecosystems, and human behavior.
1 The analytical framework used in 
this paper integrates various modeling components that range from the macro to the micro and from 
processes driven by economics to those that are essentially biophysical in nature. This section gives an 
overview of the model, data, and assumptions; more technical details can be found in Rosegrant et al. 
(2008) and Nelson et al. (2009, 2010). 
The International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) 
is a partial equilibrium agricultural model incorporating 32 crop and livestock commodities, including 
cereals, soybeans, roots and tubers, meats, milk, eggs, oilseeds, oilcakes and meals, sugar, and fruits and 
vegetables. IMPACT distinguishes 115 countries (or in a few cases country aggregates), within each of 
which supply, demand, and prices for agricultural commodities are determined. Large countries are 
further divided into major river basins. The results are called food production units. The model links the 
various countries and regions through international trade using a series of linear and nonlinear equations 
to approximate the underlying production and demand relationships. World agricultural commodity prices 
are determined annually at levels that clear international markets. Growth in crop production in each 
country is determined by crop and input prices, exogenous rates of productivity growth and area 
expansion, investment in irrigation, and water availability. Demand is a function of prices, income, and 
population growth and contains four categories of commodity demand: food, feed, biofuels feedstock, and 
other uses. 
The IMPACT climate-change-modeling system combines a biophysical model (the Decision 
Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer [DSSAT] crop-modeling suite, Jones et al. 2003) of 
responses of selected crops to climate, soil, and nutrients with the IFPRI Spatial Production Allocation 
Model dataset of crop location and management techniques (You and Wood 2006). These results are then 
aggregated and fed into IMPACT. For future climate, we use the Fourth Assessment Report of the United 
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that runs using the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) A1B and the Model for Interdisciplinary Research on Climate 
(MIROC) A1B models. For more information on the downscaling methodology, please refer to Breisinger 
et al. (2011). We assume that all climate variables change linearly between their values in 2000 and 2050. 
This assumption eliminates any random extreme events such as droughts or high-rainfall periods and also 
assumes that the forcing effects of greenhouse gas emissions proceed linearly; that is, we do not see a 
gradual speedup in climate change. The effect of this assumption is to underestimate negative effects from 
climate variability. 
Local Impacts: Impacts on Yields 
Yield changes are determined for the six major agroecological zones (AEZs) making up Yemen. The 
projected yields come from simulations using crop models in the DSSAT crop-modeling framework. The 
DSSAT crop simulation model is an extremely detailed, process-oriented model of the daily development 
of a crop, from planting to harvest ready (Jones et al. 2003). We considered four crops important to 
Yemen: maize, millet, sorghum, and wheat.
2 The DSSAT crop models are process-based crop simulation 
models. They require a large amount of input data but then can step through the prospective growing 
                                                       
1 This section draws on Nelson et al. (2009). 
2 The dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model described in the following section uses several outputs from 
the global partial equilibrium IMPACT model as drivers for agricultural and climate-change-related aspects. As a global-scale 
model, the climate change drivers in IMPACT are based on a resolution that is relatively coarse when compared with a medium-
sized country such as Yemen. Thus, even though the global projections are useful as the boundary conditions for the country-
level CGE model, the production shifters for the intracountry regions can be improved upon, if sufficient local data are available.  
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season on a daily basis and model how the plant grows, uses water and nutrients, responds to the weather, 
and ultimately accumulates mass in the harvested portion of the plant. This specificity makes the crop 
models a powerful tool for assessing the potential effects of climate change on crop yields at a very local 
geographic level, which can then be aggregated for use in the economic models. 
The most important inputs for this application were the choice of planting dates and the climatic 
conditions. The planting dates were chosen via a two-step process. First, the generally prevalent planting 
seasons were determined by region: the evidence suggests that planting occurs roughly in July in the 
higher altitudes and roughly in March in the lower ones. This target planting month was used as the 
middle of a three-month window, with yields predicted for each month in the window. Within each 
month, two planting dates were used and all the resulting yields averaged together. Finally, the overall 
yield was taken as the highest of the three-monthly yields. This approach allows for some diversity in the 
timing of planting (as is expected in the real world) as well as some flexibility since the target planting 
month might not be quite correct in all locations. 
The climatic conditions were chosen to be consistent with those in the IMPACT world market 
price projections: baseline 2000 and 2050 climates as projected by CSIRO A1B and MIROC A1B 
downscalings from the FutureClim product  (Jones et al, 2010). In general, the seasonal patterns of 
temperature and precipitation do not change much between the baseline and 2050 projections, so the same 
planting date window was used for both. Of course, the temperatures and rainfall amounts do change, 
resulting in sometimes dramatically different yields. Since the crop simulation models require daily 
weather and the climate data are available as monthly averages, a random weather generator within the 
DSSAT framework (SIMMETEO) was used to create daily realizations consistent with the monthly 
averages. For each individual planting date, 40 years of simulations were run using different weather for 
each one. Thus, for one planting month, the final average yield was based on 80 separate weather 
realizations (40 realizations times two dates). 
Once the yields were determined for each 5-arcminute pixel in Yemen, they were aggregated up 
to the AEZ level. The AEZ yields were computed as the area-weighted average yield. The projected 
yields for each pixel were multiplied by the production area thought to be present within that pixel. 
Summing across these provides the total production. Summing only the production areas provides the 
total area. Then the average yield is simply the total production divided by the total area. The production 
areas by crop within each pixel were assigned by looking in the Yemen Food Security Atlas (IFPRI and 
MOPIC 2010) and spreading out the area evenly within each district. 
Yemen Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model 
Climate change affects world prices and local agricultural production with implications for the Yemeni 
economy. Moreover, spatial variation in climate change impacts within countries means that such effects 
can vary across subnational regions. We therefore develop an economywide model for Yemen with six 
AEZs (Figure 2.1) to capture the major linkages between climate change, production, and households. 
The dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model used in this paper is consistently 
constructed with the neoclassical general equilibrium theory. The early version of this DCGE model can 
be found in Thurlow (2004), whereas its recent applications to Yemen include Breisinger, Diao, and 
Thurlow (2009). A summary of the main equations can be found in Table A.1. 
Producers in the model are price takers in output and input markets and maximize profits using 
constant-returns-to-scale technologies. Primary factor demands are derived from constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) value-added functions, whereas intermediate input demand by commodity group is 
determined by a Leontief fixed-coefficient technology. The decision of producers between production for 
domestic and foreign markets is governed by constant-elasticity-of-transformation functions that 
distinguish between exported and domestic goods in each traded commodity group in order to capture any 
quality-related differences between the two products. The export price is determined by the world price 
times the exchange rate adjusted for any taxes and subsidies. Under the small-country assumption, Yemen 
faces perfectly elastic world demand curves for its exports at fixed world prices. The revenue-maximizing  
4 
equilibrium ratio of exports to domestic goods in any traded commodity group is determined by the 
endogenous interaction of the relative prices for these two commodity types. 
Figure 2.1—Agroecological zones in Yemen 
 
Zone 1: Upper Highlands  Zone 2: Lower Highlands 
Zone 3: Red Sea and Tihama Plain  Zone 4: Arabian Sea Coast 
Zone 5: Internal Plateau  Zone 6: Desert 
Source: Authors’ creation. 
On the demand side, imported and domestic goods are treated as imperfect substitutes in both 
final and intermediate demand under a CES Armington specification. In line with the small-country 
assumption, Yemen faces an infinitely elastic world supply at fixed world prices. The equilibrium ratio of 
imports to domestic goods is determined by the cost-minimizing decisions of domestic agents based on 
the relative tax-inclusive prices of imports and domestic goods. 
The model distinguishes among various institutions, including enterprises, the government, and 
18 household groups comprising rural farm and nonfarm households as well as urban households residing 
in each of the six regional zones. Households and enterprises receive income in payment for the 
producers’ use of their factors of production. Both institutions pay direct taxes and save according to their 
respective marginal saving propensities. Enterprises pay their remaining incomes to households in the 
form of dividends. Households use their incomes to consume commodities according to a linear-
expenditure-system specification as derived from the Stone–Geary utility function. The government 
receives revenue from activity taxes, sales taxes, direct taxes, and import tariffs, and then makes transfers 
to households, enterprises, and the rest of the world. The government also purchases commodities in the 
form of government consumption expenditures, and the remaining income of the government is saved 
(with budget deficits representing negative savings). All savings from households, enterprises, the 
government, and the rest of the world (foreign savings) are collected in a savings pool from which 
investment is financed. 
The model includes three macroeconomic accounts: government balance, current account, and a 
savings-investment account. To bring about balance in the macro accounts, it is necessary to specify a set 
of macro closure rules, which provide a mechanism through which balance is achieved. A savings-driven 
investment macro closure is assumed such that investment is endogenously determined by the sum of 
private, public, and foreign savings. Private savings are assumed to be fixed proportions of net enterprise 
and household income. In the government account, the fiscal deficit and therefore public savings are 
endogenous, with government demand fixed and all tax rates held constant, so that government savings or 










of foreign savings in foreign currency terms and the nominal exchange rate are assumed to be fixed while 
the real exchange rate adjusts to maintain external balance. The model’s numeraire is the nominal 
exchange rate. 
There are six labor categories in the model, differentiated by their skills (unskilled, semiskilled, 
and skilled) and their dominating employment in public or private sectors. All types of labor are assumed 
to be fully employed and mobile across sectors. The assumption of full employment is consistent with 
widespread evidence that, whereas relatively few people have formal-sector jobs, the large majority of 
working-age people engage in activities that contribute to gross domestic product (GDP). Capital is also 
assumed to be fully employed and mobile across sectors reflecting the long-term perspective of this study. 
In agriculture, cultivated land is fixed and cannot be reallocated across crops in response to shocks. This 
assumption reflects the scarcity and overuse of water in Yemen and thus partly reflects the limited growth 
potential of the agricultural sector due to water constraints. Moreover, cropping decisions are made in the 
beginning of the period before the realization of climate shocks is imposed. 
Long-run sectoral factor productivity growth is specified exogenously. Within the CGE model, 
the decisions of consumers, producers, and investors change in response to changes in economic 
conditions driven by different sets of climate outcomes, as do market outcomes. The model allows a 
degree of endogenous adaptation within periods, with changes in labor and capital allocation across 
sectors and crops in response to shocks. 
The DCGE model is specifically built to capture the economic, distributional, and nutritional 
effects of climate change in Yemen. Given the importance of agriculture for income generation and the 
satisfaction of consumption needs, the model captures both the sectoral and spatial heterogeneity of crop 
production and its linkages to other sectors such as food processing, manufacturing, and services. The 
model includes 26 production activities and commodities, nine factors of production, and 18 household 
types. The 21 agricultural production activities are split into livestock (four), fishing (one), forestry (one), 
and crop production activities (15), where all agricultural production activities are specific to each AEZ. 
Other production sectors and commodities included in the model are mining, including oil (one), food 
processing (one), (other) industry (one), electricity and water (one), and services.
3 Major data sources for 
the social accounting matrix (SAM) construction include the latest supply-use table from the Central 
Statistics Organization, the balance of payments from the Bank of Yemen, government budget data from 
the Ministry of Finance, the 2008 Agricultural Yearbook from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation 
(MOAI 2009), and the latest Household Budget Survey (2005–2006) (CSO 2006). These data sources 
have been complemented with information from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
4 
The model runs from 2009 to 2050 and is recursive dynamic, that is, the dynamics occur between 
2009 and 2050 in each year. Investments are savings driven, and savings grow proportionally to 
household income. In the baseline scenario, as well as in all other scenarios, we assume that the nominal 
exchange rate is fixed and serves as the numeraire. The government budget is flexible, which means that 
the government can adjust to changes in revenues and spending by increasing or decreasing the budget 
deficit. Government consumption, which is exogenous, is assumed to grow at 4 percent annually. The 
Yemeni workforce is expected to grow at the same rate as the population grows following an average 
long-term trend of 2 percent as projected by the United Nations Population Division (2010). Labor supply 
is thus assumed exogenous in the model, and labor is fully mobile across sectors. It is split into skilled, 
semiskilled, and unskilled labor and by occupation in government and the private sector. Accordingly, 
there are different wage rates for labor employed within the public and the private sectors determined by 
the market equilibrium between total labor supply and total labor demand. Capital is fully employed and 
mobile to reflect the long-term perspective of this paper. Land is fixed, which means that current 
cultivated land cannot be expanded in the future. This assumption reflects the scarcity and overuse of 
water in Yemen and thus partly captures the limited growth potential of the agricultural sector due to 
                                                       
3 For a detailed list of production activities and commodities, factors of production, household types, and other accounts of 
the SAM, see Table A.2. 
4 The macro SAM is shown in Table A.3.  
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water constraints. Agriculture accounts for about 90 percent of total water usage in Yemen, and 
addressing the severe water constraint becomes imperative for Yemen’s agricultural sector as well as its 
economy as a whole. Annual total-factor productivity (TFP) growth changes in all nonagricultural and 
agricultural sectors from 2009 to 2050 complete the set of values for the exogenous variables. TFP for 
nonagricultural sectors is assumed to grow at 1 percent annually, and TFP for the agricultural sectors is 
assumed to grow at annual rates of 0.5 percent. This two-speed TFP growth in agriculture and 
nonagricultural sectors reflects the expected structural change under a business-as-usual scenario that is 
observed in all successfully transforming countries (Breisinger and Diao 2008). Under this baseline 
scenario, the share of the agricultural sector in Yemen declines from an initial 8.4 percent of GDP to 4.6 
percent of GDP by 2050. 
The model captures some autonomous adaptation to climate change. Yield changes from the 
DSSAT model enter the production function of the CGE model. These crop-specific and AEZ-specific 
changes in productivity change the returns to factors and alter output prices. For example, farm 
households can decide to employ their factors of production, such as labor, for nonfarm activities instead 
of growing crops and raising livestock. In response to changes in output prices, producers can substitute 
certain factors and inputs to react to changing relative costs of inputs. Or imported food can replace 
locally grown food when relative prices of locally grown food increase (and vice versa). A set of several 
elasticities guides such changes. The main elasticities include the substitution elasticity between primary 
inputs in the value-added production function, which determines the ease with which, for example, capital 
can be substituted for by labor inputs; the elasticity between domestically produced and consumed goods 
and exported or imported goods such as rice and wheat; and the income elasticity in the demand 
functions. The income elasticity with regard to food, for example, decides how consumers react to higher 
prices. We estimated the income elasticity for Yemen from a semi-log inverse function suggested by King 
and Byerlee (1978) and based on the data from the household income and expenditure survey HIES 
(Table A.4). For the factor substitution elasticity we choose 3.0; the elasticity of transformation is 4.0; and 
the Armington elasticity is 6.0 for all goods and services. 
The model includes 18 representative household groups for distributional and nutrition effects. 
The household groups are first separated regionally by AEZ and, within each AEZ, into urban and rural 
households. We then split rural households in each AEZ into farm and nonfarm households. This 
differentiation of household groups allows us to capture the distinctive patterns of income generation and 
consumption and the distributional impacts of climate change. The DCGE model is also linked to a 
nutrition simulation model, which allows for the endogenous estimation of climate change impacts on 
food insecurity, which we refer to as hunger in the following text due to the indicator chosen. 
Yemen Nutrition Model 
For assessing changes in people’s hunger situation as a response to changes in their income level, we use 
an expenditure-elasticity-based approach that captures the percentage change in per capita calorie 
consumption to a 1 percent change in household total expenditure (used as a proxy for household real 
income). The calorie consumption elasticities with respect to household expenditure are derived from a 
reduced-form demand model (Ecker et al. 2011). The model has households’ per capita calorie 
consumption as a dependent variable and total per capita expenditure (in logarithmic terms) as an 
independent variable and controls for structural differences between households in their gender and age 
composition and educational level, their levels of food self-sufficiency and qat consumption, and regional 
and seasonality patterns.
5 Depending on the income level, we calculate household-specific calorie 
consumption elasticities. On average, a 1 percent increase in household per capita income is associated 
with an increase in people’s per capita calorie consumption of 0.3 percent.
6 
                                                       
5 See Table A.5 for the regression results. 
6 The standard deviation of the elasticity is 0.148.  
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To simulate the hunger effects of climate change, we combine the annual real income growth 
rates obtained from the DCGE model with the calorie consumption elasticities from the econometric 
models for each household individually. Assuming specific changes in different macroeconomic 
parameters under different climate change scenarios, we predict a new calorie consumption level for each 
household per annum, subject to the estimated annual income changes. The simulation equation is 
(neglecting subscripts for households) 
  ) 1 ( ˆ , 1 , , j i j i j i c E y y ⋅ + ⋅ = − ,  (1) 
where  j i y , ˆ  is a household’s predicted calorie consumption level under scenario i and in year j,  1 , − j i y  is 
the calorie consumption level in the previous year, E is the household-specific calorie consumption–
expenditure elasticity, and  j i c ,  is the annual income change of the household the person belongs to under 
scenario i and in year j. A household’s new calorie consumption level is then related to its individual 
requirement level to identify whether the household is suffering from hunger or is sufficiently supplied 
with dietary energy. The household-specific requirement levels are calculated based on the household’s 
sex and age composition and the individual physiological dietary energy requirements of the household 
members, using standard reference levels (FAO/WHO/UNU 2001). Thus, households with calorie 
consumption levels below the household-specific threshold are considered as calorie deficient, or hungry. 
Using household size and population estimates from the 2010 revision of World Population Prospects 
(UN Population Division 2010), we calculate the prevalence rate and number of hungry people. 
Based on the DCGE and hunger microsimulation model, we design four sets of scenarios. The 
first set captures the global impacts of climate change, and the second set assesses the local impacts of 
climate change. The third set combines the two to assess the joint effects, and the fourth looks at the 
impacts of flood (Table 2.1). Within the first set of scenarios, we design three scenarios: scenario 1 
changes the world food prices consistent with IMPACT results under perfect mitigation; scenario 1A 
explores climate-change-related price effects under MIROC A1B, with the assumption that no climate 
change impacts are felt locally in Yemen; and scenario 1B is a scenario to test the sensitivity of results to 
alternative price projections under CSIRO A1B (see Figure 3.1 for alternative price changes). Scenario 2 
imposes the yield changes from the DSSAT model on a crop-by-crop level and by AEZ. The related 
matching between DSSAT results and CGE production activities is shown in Appendix B. Results for 
scenarios 1A–3B are reported as a change from the perfect global mitigation scenario to isolate the 
climate change effects, whereas those for scenarios 1 and 4 are presented relative to the baseline. 
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Table 2.1—Climate change scenarios 
Scenario  Change in model  Input 
Baseline  See text  See text 
Global impacts of climate change 
      Scenario 1  Perfect mitigation, compared to base  IMPACT, Perfect mitigation 
      Scenario 1A  Climate change  IMPACT, MIROC A1B 
      Scenario 1B  Climate change  IMPACT, CSIRO A1B 
Local impacts 
     Scenario 2A  Crop yield changes  DSSAT MIROC A1B 
     Scenario 2B  Crop yield changes  DSSAT CSIRO A1B 
Joint impacts 
     Scenario 3A  1A and 2A  IMPACT and DSSAT, MIROC A1B 
     Scenario 3B  1B and 2B  IMPACT and DSSAT, CSIRO A1B 
Joint impacts 
     Scenario 4  Changes of cropland and livestock, and fishery yields  See text 
Source: Author’s compilation.  
9 
3.  IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN YEMEN 
Structure of the Yemeni Economy, Household Incomes, and Food Security 
Oil and agriculture are the two mainstays of the Yemeni economy, but both are under threat, thereby 
increasing the country’s vulnerability to global commodity price changes. Oil reserves are set to run out 
by the beginning of the next decade, and aquifers upon which irrigated agriculture depends have been 
seriously depleted in recent years. Although oil is still the dominant sector, oil production is on a 
declining trend, indicating that other sectors in the economy will have to contribute increasingly to 
growth. In the absence of new oil discoveries, it is estimated that Yemen may become a net importer of 
oil as soon as 2016. This will have a significant impact on the economy given that oil revenues account 
for 60 percent of government receipts and almost 90 percent of exports (International Monetary Fund 
2009 and Table 3.1). Yemen is also a net importer of major food items, including maize, wheat, other 
grains, livestock, fish, and processed food. Agriculture’s trade orientation is uneven, with imports 
accounting for more than a third of total domestic consumption and exports accounting for less than 5 
percent of domestic production. 
Agriculture and related processing contribute about 13 percent to GDP, about three-quarters of 
which is produced in the highly populated AEZs 1 and 2 (the Upper and Lower Highlands, with 30 and 
40 percent of the total population living in these zones). Qat accounts for more than one-third of 
agricultural GDP and about 40 percent of total water resource use. Vegetables and fruits make up another 
one-third of agricultural GDP. Livestock and cereals contribute about 20 and 10 percent to agricultural 
GDP, respectively (Table 3.2). Qat is almost exclusively concentrated in AEZs 1 and 2, whereas other 
water-intensive crops such as fruits and vegetables are also grown in zone 3 (the Red Sea and Tihama 
Plain Zone). AEZs 1 and 2 are the two main contributors to agricultural and overall GDP, followed by 
zones 3, 5, 4, and 6. The latter three zones together account for only 8 percent of agricultural GDP. Zones 
5 and 6 are the major producers of sesame and camel, however. Food and agriculture-related processing 
makes up about 50 percent of household consumption expenditures. Within this category, food processing 
constitutes the largest share of consumption, followed by cereals, qat, vegetables, and fruits (Table 3.1). 
A major determinant of food security at the household level is household income. Dividing up 
households according to socioeconomic characteristics, such as their location and occupation, allows for 
the analysis of income and distributional effects of climate change. Farm households, which make up 
about 24 percent of total population, earn about 16 percent of all household incomes, whereas the 
population and income shares are 49 and 47 percent for rural nonfarm households and 27 and 37 percent 
for urban households. As expected, household income levels are strongly related to factor and human 
capital endowments. As Table 3.3 shows, farm households receive most of their income from unskilled 
labor and land (each about 30 percent), whereas urban households rely more on skilled labor (about 55 
percent). The dominating income source of rural nonfarm households is unskilled and semiskilled labor. 
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Table 3.1—Structure of the Yemeni economy by sector, 2009 











Sorghum  0.3  0.6  0.0  1.4  0.0  0.4 
Maize  0.1  0.8  0.0  1.3  1.1  68.9 
Millet  0.1  0.2         
Wheat  0.2  5.4  0.1  6.2  8.7  93.6 
Barley  0.1  0.2         
Other grains  0.0  2.4      3.8  99.8 
Fruits  0.9  1.5  0.5  12.0  0.3  10.0 
Potatos  0.4  0.7  0.2  9.3  0.0  1.1 
Vegetables  1.1  2.3  0.1  2.0  0.1  3.2 
Pulses  0.2  0.4         
Coffee  0.2    0.5  54.7  0.0  2.6 
Sesame  0.0    0.0  10.4     
Cotton  0.1    0.0  5.3  0.0  3.3 
Qat  2.8  5.5         
Tobacco  0.2  0.8      0.8  61.1 
Camel  0.1    0.5  71.0  0.0  15.5 
Cattle  0.4    0.1  2.3  0.2  10.0 
Poultry  0.6        0.5  10.5 
Goats and sheep  0.4    0.1  3.1  0.3  15.7 
Fish  0.3    0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3 
Forestry  0.2  0.7      0.5  41.9 
Mining  22.5  1.0  88.7  95.0     
Food processing  4.0  26.5  1.5  3.6  13.9  33.8 
Other industry  10.9  18.8  1.2  1.9  69.7  61.3 
Utilities  1.2  1.9         
Services  53.1  30.4  6.6  2.2     
Total, of which:  100.0  100.0  100.0  18.0  100.0  24.0 
  Agriculture  8.4  21.5  2.1  4.5  16.3  34.4 
  Nonagriculture  91.6  78.5  97.9  19.2  83.7  22.7 
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Note: Import intensities are calculated as shares of total domestic consumption (final and intermediate). Export intensities are the 
ratios of exports to domestic production. 
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Table 3.2—Agricultural value-added by zone and crop, 2009 (billions of Yemeni rials and percent) 






























Sorghum  7.36  5.25  5.10  3.09  3.65  4.71  0.07  0.67  0.10  0.54  0.00  0.01  16.29  2.68 
Maize  2.50  1.78  4.09  2.48  0.35  0.46  0.01  0.06  0.01  0.04  0.00  0.02  6.96  1.12 
Millet  1.83  1.31  0.55  0.33  2.59  3.35  0.03  0.29  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.00  5.01  0.96 
Wheat  1.03  0.73  6.05  3.66  0.17  0.22  0.00  0.00  0.19  0.97  0.05  1.95  7.48  1.23 
Other grains  0.19  0.14  3.53  2.14  0.04  0.05      0.01  0.05  0.00  0.03  3.76  0.91 
Fruits  4.55  3.25  8.35  5.06  23.87  30.80  0.15  1.35  8.81  45.81  0.02  0.84  45.76  13.86 
Potatos  15.78  11.26  0.79  0.48  0.86  1.10  0.01  0.05  0.18  0.94  0.00  0.02  17.60  2.62 
Vegetables  8.88  6.34  11.67  7.07  7.36  9.49  2.29  20.65  1.33  6.91  0.04  1.34  31.56  8.25 
Tomatos  10.78  7.69  3.62  2.19  5.22  6.74  0.20  1.77  2.04  10.62  0.03  1.26  21.90  4.68 
Pulses  5.77  4.12  0.70  0.43  1.51  1.95  0.19  1.70  0.05  0.25  0.01  0.34  8.23  1.26 
Coffee  0.29  0.21  7.41  4.49  0.02  0.03              7.73  1.21 
Sesame  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.34  0.44  0.00  0.03  0.59  3.07  0.27  10.45  1.27  0.48 
Cotton      0.24  0.15  5.02  6.48  0.05  0.41  0.00  0.00    0.00  5.31  5.17 
Qat  55.95  39.93  84.18  50.99  0.06  0.08  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.57  140.20  18.93 
Tobacco      0.11  0.06  8.54  11.01  0.01  0.07          8.65  1.97 
Camel  0.22  0.16  0.52  0.31  0.28  0.36  0.52  4.71  1.20  6.23  1.34  51.09  4.07  1.82 
Cattle  3.75  2.68  10.25  6.21  3.66  4.72  0.51  4.61  0.12  0.64  0.06  2.45  18.36  4.65 
Poultry  17.38  12.40  10.18  6.16  1.42  1.83  0.41  3.65  0.59  3.05  0.03  1.19  29.99  4.69 
Goats and 
sheep  3.83  2.74  7.73  4.68  2.45  3.17  2.58  23.26  4.01  20.86  0.74  28.43  21.36  7.26 
Fish          10.09  13.02  4.08  36.71          14.17  16.22 
Total  140.11  100.00  165.09  100.00  77.50  100.00  11.10  100.00  19.23  100.00  2.61  100.00  415.66  100.00 
Percent  33.71    39.72    18.64    2.67    4.63    0.63    100.00   
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Note: YER: Yemeni rials. 
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Table 3.3—Structure of household income sources (by income type and household categories), 2009 
   Private sector  Public sector  Land  Livestock  Governm.  RoW  Total 
   Unskilled  Semiskilled  Skilled  Unskilled  Semiskilled  Skilled                
Zone 1, rural farm  32.6  0.4  18.5  0.8  0.6  12.2  25.3  1.0  2.9  5.8  100.0 
Zone 1, rural nonfarm  31.7  21.4  10.3  5.7  3.7  17.1  1.2  0.0  1.7  7.2  100.0 
Zone 1, urban  11.3  5.5  27.9  4.2  2.5  36.8  1.4  0.0  3.3  7.1  100.0 
Zone 2, rural farm  21.0  2.0  17.8  0.3  0.3  3.7  33.4  1.2  5.1  15.1  100.0 
Zone 2, rural nonfarm  31.7  15.8  21.9  2.5  1.3  15.9  1.8  0.0  2.7  6.5  100.0 
Zone 2, urban  16.0  3.9  20.8  5.7  1.1  33.0  2.3  0.0  4.6  12.5  100.0 
Zone 3, rural farm  34.5  9.9  0.8  0.0  0.0  1.2  35.4  0.9  1.9  15.5  100.0 
Zone 3, rural nonfarm  67.1  4.7  21.0  0.2  0.1  2.2  1.5  0.0  0.6  2.7  100.0 
Zone 3, urban  24.6  17.8  26.5  6.1  1.2  15.8  1.6  0.0  2.2  4.2  100.0 
Zone 4, rural farm  4.6  45.1  7.0  1.7  0.0  2.8  6.5  2.4  17.3  12.6  100.0 
Zone 4, rural nonfarm  26.9  9.8  11.8  4.0  9.8  12.5  0.1  0.0  12.4  12.7  100.0 
Zone 4, urban  14.2  9.1  10.7  8.1  5.6  30.2  0.1  0.0  11.2  10.7  100.0 
Zone 5, rural farm  30.0  1.8  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.3  31.1  2.3  7.7  26.1  100.0 
Zone 5, rural nonfarm  9.5  27.3  29.5  1.8  7.2  7.6  1.0  0.0  3.4  12.7  100.0 
Zone 5, urban  20.4  22.8  36.2  1.1  1.4  8.5  1.5  0.0  2.1  6.1  100.0 
Zone 6, rural farm  82.9  0.3  0.0  1.1  1.1  2.9  1.1  0.7  3.3  6.5  100.0 
Zone 6, rural nonfarm  49.9  4.0  14.1  2.0  1.0  20.2  0.0  0.0  2.7  6.0  100.0 
Zone 6, urban  51.0  1.9  6.5  17.1  0.1  17.0  0.1  0.0  3.0  3.3  100.0 
Rural farm  29.0  3.5  14.4  0.5  0.4  6.5  28.8  1.1  4.2  11.6  100.0 
Rural nonfarm  36.4  15.6  19.7  2.7  2.2  12.9  1.5  0.0  2.3  6.6  100.0 
Urban  14.7  8.1  24.2  5.2  2.6  31.2  1.3  0.0  4.6  8.1  100.0 
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
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The food security situation in Yemen is highly vulnerable to shocks such as food price surges and 
climate variability. The vulnerability is demonstrated by the relatively small difference between what 
Yemenis consume every day and what they need to stave off hunger at their current level of activity—less 
than 300 kilocalories per day (kcal/day) nationwide (Table 3.4). This means that the average Yemeni 
consumes only 15 percent more than the 2,019 kcal/day needed to avoid hunger. 

















All  32.1  7,481  2,301  282 
Urban  17.7  1,102  2,160  380 
Rural  37.3  6,378  2,352  246 
Agroecological zones         
Upper Highlands  36.5  3,739  2,323  252 
Lower Highlands  19.4  1,197  2,411  443 
Red Sea & Tihama  27.7  920  2,362  360 
Arabian Sea  35.3  568  2,027  142 
Internal Plateau  56.5  868  1,909  -142 
Desert  44.0  189  2,167  119 
Source: IFPRI estimation based on 2005–2006 Household Budget Survey data. 
People living in rural areas are more likely to fall into food insecurity than people living in urban 
areas. Although the average per capita calorie consumption is higher by 200 kcal/day in rural areas than in 
urban areas, the average per capita calorie gap is lower by about 130 kcal/day. This difference is the result 
of the significantly higher calorie needs of rural people (2,106 kcal/day on average) compared with urban 
people (1,708 kcal/day on average). Rural people need more calories for fetching water from wells, 
carrying goods to and purchases from markets over long distances, and working hard on farms and in 
fisheries. 
At the regional level the food-insecurity rate strongly varies between AEZs and is alarmingly 
high in the Internal Plateau. The food-insecurity rate presented in Table 3.4 reveals large differences in 
the spread of food insecurity across AEZs. The prevalence rate is lower along the Red Sea coast (Red Sea 
and Tihama Zone) and in the Upper Highlands Zone (which starts at 1,900 meters above sea level), where 
the country’s capital, Sana’a, is located. The food-insecurity rate rises toward the eastern inland region, 
which comprises the Internal Plateau Zone and the Desert Zone. The food-insecurity rate is lowest in the 
Lower Highlands Zone (located at an altitude of 1,500 to 1,900 meters above sea level), home to less than 
20 percent of the population. It is highest in the Internal Plateau, where more than half the population is 
food insecure. The AEZs that are better off in terms of food security also have high percentages of 
urbanized population. The Internal Plateau is the only zone showing an average calorie deficit, which 
exceeds 140 kcal/day. Thus the availability of dietary energy (at affordable prices) in this zone is 
insufficient to supply all people there with adequate calories. However, districts have considerable 
differences in the prevalence of food insecurity. 
Although the rate of prevalence of food insecurity in the highlands is low, in absolute numbers 
most food-insecure people are living there. Yemen’s highland region (comprising the Lower and Upper 
Highlands Zones) is the most densely populated region in the country. Seventy percent of the Yemeni 
population and 66 percent of the food insecure live in this region, and most of them live more than 1,900 
meters above sea level. Half of all of Yemen’s food-insecure people reside in the Upper Highlands. 
It is against these structural characteristics of the Yemeni economy and its households that the next 
sections analyze the potential impacts of climate change.  
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Global Impacts of Climate Change 
World food prices are projected to increase through demographic and income effects, which are 
augmented by climate change. Figure 3.1 reports the effects of the climate change scenarios of two global 
climate models on world food prices (CSIRO A1B and MIROC A1B). It also reports the price effects 
under perfect mitigation. With perfect mitigation, world prices for important agricultural crops such as 
wheat and maize will increase between 2000 and 2050 under both scenarios, driven by population and 
income growth and biofuels demand. The price of maize and wheat is projected to rise by 63 percent and 
39 percent, respectively. Climate change results in additional price increases—a total of 52 to 55 percent 
for maize and 94 to 111 percent for wheat (Nelson et al. 2009).
7 Prices of vegetables and fruits as well as 
cotton hardly change over time in the perfect mitigation scenario but are expected to rise considerably as 
a consequence of climate change. Livestock are not directly affected by climate change in IMPACT. 
However, the effects of higher feed prices caused by climate change pass through to livestock, resulting in 
somewhat higher meat prices. 
Figure 3.1—Global food price scenarios 
 
                                                       
7 In addition to various Global Climate Models (GCMs), Nelson et al. (2010) also include low, medium, and high 




Source: IFPRI’s International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT). 
Note: NoCC stand for no climate change or perfect mitigation. Tons are in metric tons. 
Results of the DCGE model for Yemen show that climate-change-related global food price 
increases may benefit the agricultural sector in Yemen through higher returns to production factors. 
Despite the fixed supply of land (to reflect water scarcity), agricultural activities benefit from price 
increases, attract additional capital and labor, and thereby increase production. Compared with perfect 
mitigation, the annual average agricultural growth rate is between 0.1 and 0.5 percent higher in the 
MIROC scenario and between 0.1 and 0.2 percent higher in the CSIRO scenario and exhibits an 
increasing trend over time (Figure 3.2). The positive effect on agricultural GDP growth cannot outweigh 
the negative effect on other sectors, which reduces the overall annual growth rate by 0.01 percent between 
2010 and 2050, relative to the case of perfect global mitigation. This slower growth can be explained by 
Yemen’s particular structure of agricultural trade, where import intensities are far higher than export 
intensities (Table 3.1). As a consequence, the impact of rising import prices on domestic costs of living 
dominates the impact of rising export prices on domestic revenues—that is, the terms of trade worsen. 
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Figure 3.2—Impacts of global changes on agricultural GDP, 2010–2050 
   
Source: Yemen DCGE Model.  
Impacts on agricultural GDP growth vary by AEZ depending on the zone’s production structure. 
In general, zones that produce more of the commodities that experience the largest world market price 
increases relative to other commodities benefit the most (Figure 3.2). The average annual agricultural 
growth rates in zones 1 through 6 range between -0.06 percent below and 1.2 percent above the perfect 
mitigation scenario over the entire period. Producers in zone 3 disproportionately benefit from rising 
prices for a range of commodities such as fruits, vegetables, and cotton, whereas at the other extreme, 
agricultural GDP in zone 4 does not rise at all because a large share of its value-added is not affected by 
price changes. The pattern of responses of agricultural growth to global climate change is the same 
irrespective of which of the two climate scenarios we adopt. However, impacts are generally somewhat 
dampened in the CSIRO scenario, since this scenario predicts a more moderate rise in global food prices 
(Figure 3.1). Most notably, agricultural growth in zone 3 still rises more strongly than in the other zones, 
but no longer in such an exceptional way as in the MIROC scenario. In absolute terms, zones 1 through 3 
clearly benefit most given that more than 90 percent of agricultural value-added is produced in these 
zones. 
But despite the positive effects on agriculture, all household groups—rural farm and nonfarm 
households as well as urban households—see a decline in their real incomes. Consistent with changes in 
agricultural output, the effect is somewhat less pronounced under the CSIRO scenario. The household 
group that could be expected to benefit from the global rise in food prices is the rural farm household 
sector. However, the fact that many farm households are net consumers of food implies that their real 
income is on balance between 0.01 and 0.7 percent lower per year compared with the perfect mitigation 
case (Figure 3.3). Urban households are also negatively affected as a result of global climate change, but 
their losses are not higher than those for rural farm households. This is because urban households spend a 
much lower share of their budget on food, which partly offsets the higher vulnerability to rising food 
prices resulting from a more pronounced net food buyer status. The rural nonfarm households are by far 
hardest hit as they tend to be net food buyers with high food budget shares. Overall, the adverse effects of 
global climate change on households are non-negligible, with incomes lowered by more than 1 percent on 
average in the year 2050.  
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Figure 3.3—Impacts of global changes on household incomes, 2010–2050 
   
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
When interpreting the results of the global scenario, it is important to keep in mind that climate 
change affects world food prices only through changes in global production and consumption. However, 
this scenario did not capture how Yemeni farmers are affected by locally changing yields and related 
spillover effects, effects that are analyzed in the next section. 
Local Impacts of Climate Change 
Temperature and Rainfall Variations in Yemen 
Results from the spatially downscaled climate projections show that temperatures are expected to rise 
over their baseline counterpart under both the CSIRO and the MIROC Global Climate Model (GCM) 
scenarios. However, the variation in temperatures over their baseline equivalents—both minimum and 
maximum—differs under the CSIRO and the MIROC scenarios (Figure 3.4). Under the CSIRO scenario, 
variations are limited for both the minimum and maximum temperatures. CSIRO monthly maximum 
temperatures do not rise beyond 1.7 degrees Celsius above baseline maximum temperatures and rise 2.3 
degrees Celsius above baseline for the average monthly temperatures. Under the MIROC scenario, the 
variations are far greater for both the minimum and maximum temperatures. For nine months out of the 
year, the MIROC scenario predicts a more-than-2-degree rise in temperatures by 2050 in minimum 
temperatures over the baseline, and in May, the MIROC scenario predicts that minimum temperatures 
will rise over their baseline values by more than 3 degrees Celsius. Maximum temperatures are also 
expected to increase over their baseline values under the MIROC scenario. For four months out of the 
year, MIROC temperature highs are expected to rise more than 2 degrees Celsius over their baseline 
equivalents and by more than 3 degrees Celsius over their baseline equivalents.  
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Figure 3.4—Average monthly temperature in Yemen (degrees Celsius) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
Variation in average monthly rainfall across Yemen, as predicted by the CSIRO and MIROC 
GCM scenarios, is significant only for the latter scenario. As Figure 3.5 shows, average monthly rainfall 
(in millimeters) of the CSIRO scenario roughly follows the baseline. However, the MIROC scenario 
predicts an increase in rainfall
8 from June to October across Yemen. From October to December, rainfall 
under the MIROC scenario is below that predicted under the baseline. This pattern of variation (or lack 
thereof for the CSIRO scenario) is consistent across all of Yemen’s regions with the exception of the 
Upper Highlands, where the rainfall predictions under the CSIRO scenario are significantly lower than 
their baseline equivalents.
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Figure 3.5—Average monthly rainfall (millimeters) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
                                                       
8 As previously described, variations in average monthly rainfall are compared with the equivalent baseline estimates. 
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Changes in rainfall and temperature are the main drivers of yield changes: all else was kept the 
same for the simulations. Yield changes over time due to climate change are projected to vary strongly 
across major grains as well as AEZs. Table 3.5 shows the results from the DSSAT crop model by AEZ. 
Driven mainly by the diverging rainfall patterns, projected yield changes for sorghum and millet differ 
substantially between the MIROC and CSIRO scenarios. Clearly, in an arid region, having more abundant 
water could greatly increase yield potentials. Accordingly, average sorghum and millet yields increase 
substantially under the MIROC scenario, whereas under the CSIRO scenario they evolve less favorably, 
and even decline by 0.6 percent per year in the Desert Zone. 
Table 3.5—Average annual yield changes for selected crops, 2000–2050 
   Maize  Millet  Sorghum  Wheat 
   Irrigated  Rainfed  Irrigated  Rainfed  Irrigated  Rainfed  Irrigated  Rainfed 
  MIROC (% yield changes) 
Yemen   0.1  1.4  2.6  4.0  2.4  2.7  -0.3  0.1 
Upper Highlands   0.3  1.3  3.4  3.6  2.3  2.4  -0.3  0.1 
Lower Highlands   0.0  1.7  2.6  3.3  2.1  2.4  -0.4  0.3 
Red Sea and 
Tihama   -0.2  -0.5  1.7  4.0  3.5  4.0  -0.9  -1.0 
Arabian Sea   -0.1  0.2  1.8  4.0  4.0  4.0  -0.2  -0.3 
Internal Plateau   -0.1  0.7  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  -0.1  1.6 
Desert   -0.1  -0.4  1.5  4.0  2.9  4.0  -0.1  -0.8 
  CSIRO (% yield changes) 
Yemen   0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3  -0.2  -0.1 
Upper Highlands   0.2  0.3  0.8  1.0  0.8  0.8  -0.2  -0.1 
Lower Highlands   -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  -0.5  -0.3 
Red Sea and 
Tihama   -0.1  -0.4  -0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  -0.5  -0.5 
Arabian Sea   -0.1  -0.3  -0.2  0.2  0.1  0.3  -0.1  -0.3 
Internal Plateau   0.0  -0.7  0.3  0.8  0.0  0.2  -0.1  -0.4 
Desert   0.0  -0.5  -0.3  -0.9  -0.5  -0.8  -0.1  -0.6 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on DSSAT. 
Given these strong yield results under the MIROC scenario, an important question that arises is 
how unexpected such a large increase in precipitation is for climate projections in the case of Yemen. We 
compared the monthly rainfall projections for the FutureClim downscalings (those used for the crop 
modeling) with downscalings using an alternate methodology (Tabor and Williams 2010) that has 
datasets available at the same spatial resolution as FutureClim for all of the major GCMs. We found that 
the summertime increase in precipitation is found in most of the other GCM projections and as such does 
not appear to be a unique artifact (Figure 3.6).  
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Figure 3.6—Projected monthly rainfall by 2050 under alternative GCMs for Yemen 
 
Source: Author’s representation based on Tabor and Williams (2010). 
Note: Data are available at http://ccr.aos.wisc.edu/climate_modeling/ipcc/futclimateinfo.html. Please note that the downscaling 
method (and baselines) of Tabor and Williams are not exactly the same as those used as inputs for the DSSAT modeling (for 
comparison: corresponding results for Tabor and Williams (dashed lines). The baseline used for DSSAT modeling is the heavy 
black line. The two models used for DSSAT are the heavy solid lines. All the others are based on Tabor and Williams. 
Results of the DCGE model show that the local effects of climate change depend to a large extent 
on the adopted scenario. Under the MIROC scenario, local climate change slightly raises agricultural 
growth; the direction and magnitude of the change for the six AEZs differs depending on their crop mix 
(Figure 3.7). Changes in the agricultural GDP growth rate compared with perfect mitigation range 
between 0.05 and 0.6 percent, whereas average annual economy-wide growth rises by 0.01 percent. 
Among the regions, zone 3 benefits most from local climate change. This is because in this zone sorghum 
and millet experience high yield increases and at the same time account for a larger share of agricultural  
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value-added than in any other zone, whereas the grains with declining yields (maize and wheat) are hardly 
produced. Losses are incurred in the Desert Zone (6) where grain production is limited to wheat. Under 
the CSIRO scenario, positive and negative yield changes cancel each other out. As a result, agricultural 
GDP hardly changes versus the perfect mitigation scenario. 
Figure 3.7—Impacts of local changes on agricultural GDP, 2010–2050 
   
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Local climate change is welfare enhancing for all household groups when we consider the 
MIROC scenario. The largest beneficiaries are rural farm households, whose annual income is between 
0.03 and 1.3 percent higher than under perfect mitigation (Figure 3.8). Those households are affected 
through two major channels: first, their income gains from higher agricultural yields are not fully 
compensated for by lower prices they receive for their products. Second, as net consumers they benefit 
from decreasing prices for millet and sorghum. The price effect also explains the considerable increase in 
real incomes for rural nonfarm households. Urban households, in contrast, hardly consume the 
commodities that have become cheaper and therefore realize only negligible income gains. Under the 
CSIRO scenario, real income changes are close to zero for all three household groups. 
Figure 3.8—Impacts of local changes on household incomes, 2010–2050 
 




Combined Climate Change Impacts 
Considering the global and local effects of climate change jointly shows that the effects cancel each other 
out at the macro level. Economic growth does on average not differ from the case of perfect mitigation. 
Whereas the share of agriculture in the economy falls as part of the general economic transformation 
process (Table 3.6), that pattern of structural change is even slightly reversed due to the global effects of 
climate change, which render the production of various agricultural commodities more profitable. 
Table 3.6—Structural change under climate change scenarios (% of GDP) 
         MIROC  CSIRO 
      Initial  2030  2050  2030  2050 
Perfect Mitigation           
Agriculture    8.4  6.0  4.6  6.0  4.6 
Industry    38.5  39.3  39.3  39.3  39.3 
Services    53.1  54.7  56.1  54.7  56.1 
Global             
Agriculture    8.4  6.2  5.1  6.1  4.9 
Industry    38.5  39.2  39.0  39.3  39.1 
Services    53.1  54.6  55.9  54.6  56.0 
Local             
Agriculture    8.4  5.9  4.5  5.8  4.2 
Industry    38.5  39.4  39.4  39.4  39.5 
Services    53.1  54.8  56.1  54.8  56.3 
Combined             
Agriculture    8.4  6.3  5.4  6.1  4.8 
Industry    38.5  39.2  38.9  39.3  39.2 
Services     53.1  54.5  55.8  54.6  56.0 
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Results for the agricultural sector differ noticeably between the MIROC and CSIRO scenarios. 
Agricultural output rises under the combined MIROC climate change scenario with increasing speed over 
time. As shown in the previous section, the impacts of both local and global climate change in isolation 
have positive implications for agricultural production. The agricultural growth rate in the combined 
scenario is between 0.02 and 1.0 percent higher each year than under perfect mitigation (Figure 3.9). The 
overall rise in yields due to the local impacts of climate change translates into lower domestic agricultural 
prices and also a fall in imports. Lower domestic prices enhance competiveness on the world market and 
thus also affect Yemen’s exports of agricultural crops. This latter effect is amplified when global climate 
change is factored in and globally higher crop prices provide a boost to the agricultural sector and 
improve agricultural export performance, thus leading to faster growth of the agricultural sector (versus 
perfect mitigation). In contrast, due to less optimistic yield predictions, agricultural growth in the CSIRO 
scenario is only slightly higher than with perfect mitigation when both local and global climate change 
effects are taken into account. 
The combined effects of global and local climate change turn out to be favorable for agricultural 
production in all economically important zones (Figure 3.9b), but again much less so under the CSIRO 
scenario than under the MIROC scenario. In zone 3, the positive impacts of local and global climate 
change in the form of rising agricultural yields and rising world food prices add up to agricultural growth 
that in the year 2050 is between 0.5 percent (CSIRO scenario) and 2.4 percent (MIROC scenario) higher 
compared with perfect mitigation. For the two biggest regions in terms of agricultural value-added, zones 
1 and 2, effects are more modest, with a rise in production by up to 0.4 percent in the CSIRO scenario and 
0.6 percent in the MIROC scenario. Only in zones 4 and 6, which together account for not more than 3  
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percent of total agricultural value-added, agricultural GDP is hardly affected by the combined effects of 
climate change. 
Figure 3.9a—Impacts of local, global, and combined changes on agricultural GDP, 2010–2050 
   
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Figure 3.9b—Impacts of combined local and global changes on agroecological zones, 2010–2050 
   
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Taking the global and local impacts of climate change together in general results in a reduction of 
household welfare under both scenarios. Only farm households may benefit under MIROC predictions, 
but incomes for rural nonfarm households and urban households fall (Figure 3.10). Even though as net 
consumers farm households end up paying more for their food basket when world food prices rise, they 
on balance realize income gains because of the substantial yield increases for sorghum and millet. Rural 
nonfarm households and urban households, in contrast, are hit harder by the price effects of global climate 
change and benefit only indirectly—via falling prices—from the yield effects of local global climate 
change. As a consequence, their real income falls by up to 0.8 and 0.7 percent, respectively. Under the 
CSIRO scenario, the gains of farm households turn into losses, and rural nonfarm households see much 
stronger reductions in real household income as they no longer benefit from lower prices induced by 
higher yields.  
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Figure 3.10—Impacts of combined local and global changes on household incomes 
   
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Changes in real incomes not only differ between household groups but also exhibit considerable 
variation across regions. With the exception of rural farm households in zone 3 (and in zone 2 under the 
MIROC scenario), all households suffer real income losses as a result of the combined local and global 
impacts of climate change (Table 3.7). Although the effects of climate change do not reveal a clear 
distributional pattern, some of the poorest sections of Yemeni society are among the hardest hit. Most 
notably, farm households in the Desert Zone have the lowest initial per capita income and are expected to 
experience the biggest income losses. They suffer most mainly due to the joint effect of being net food 
buyers, spending a high share of income on food, and specializing in agricultural activities that do not 
benefit from higher prices and increasing yields. Nonfarm households in zones 4 and 6 are other examples 
of poor groups incurring considerable losses. 
Table 3.7—Distributional impacts, local and global climate change, and world price changes 
Household 
group  Population 
Per capita 
income 
(thousand YER)  
Average annual change, 2010–2050 (%) 



















Urban   1  2,669,219.1  242  -0.5  -0.5 - -0.4  0.0  -0.4  -1.0 - -0.9 
  2  1,203,688  161  -0.6  -0.6 - -0.5  0.1 - 0.0  -0.5  -1.1 
  3  774,200  177  -0.3  -0.4  0.1 - 0.0  -0.3 - -0.4  -0.6 - -0.7 
  4  1,157,983  170  -0.3  -0.6 - -0.5  0.0  -0.5  -0.8 
  5  302,989  159  -0.8  -0.9 - -0.8  0.0  -0.8  -1.6 
  6  41,809  137  -0.8  -0.6 - -0.5  0.0  -0.7 - -0.6  -1.4 - -1.3 
Rural  
nonfarm   1  1,946,108.60  152  -1.8  -1.2 - -0.9  0.1 - 0.0  -1.1 - -1.0  -2.9 - -2.8 
  2  5,836,100.10  118  -1.8  -1.2 - -0.9  0.9 - 0.1  -0.3 - -0.9  -2.1 - -2.6 
  3  1,616,577.60  133  -1.0  -0.9 - -0.8  0.6 - 0.0  -0.3 - -0.8  -1.3 - -1.8 
  4  320,780.39  100  -0.6  -0.9 - -0.8  0.0  -0.8  -1.5 - -1.4 
  5  999,507.30  127  -1.1  -1.1 - -0.9  0.0  -1.1 - -1.0  -2.2 - -2.1 




group  Population 
Per capita 
income 
(thousand YER)  
Average annual change, 2010–2050 (%) 



















Rural farm   1  1,601,351.00  147  -1.8  -0.6 - -0.4  0.0 - -0.1  -0.5  -2.4 
  2  2,544,788.70  90  -2.0  -0.6 - -0.4  1.2 - 0.1  0.6 - -0.3  -1.4 - -2.4 
  3  737,258.54  108  -1.0  -0.0 - -0.1  1.6 - 0.2  1.6 - 0.1   0.6 - -0.9 
  4  134,267.62  111  -0.9  -0.7  0.0  -0.7  -1.6 
  5  208,785.15  105  -1.0  -0.4  0.0 - -0.1  -0.4 - -0.5  -1.5 - -1.6 
  6  189,341.65  87  -1.5  -1.1 - -0.9  0.0 - -0.1  -1.2 - -1.0  -2.7 - -2.5 
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Notes:
 a The first number in the cell indicates the MIROC result; the second number indicates the CSIRO result. 
The long-term implications of climate change (local and global) lead to a total reduction of household welfare of 1,161.2 or 
1,873.6 billion Yemeni rials (YER)(US$5.7 or US$9.2 billion
10) by 2050 under MIROC or CSIRO conditions, respectively 
(Figure 3.11). These reductions in welfare accumulate over time. In 2020, household incomes are projected to be 63.8 or 82.0 
billion YER ($314.4 or $404.2 million) lower versus a perfect mitigation scenario, whereas those losses increase to 269.6 or 
366.8 billion YER ($1.3 or $1.8 billion) by 2030. Rural households suffer more from climate change than urban households. 
Rural households’ incomes by 2050 are 630.1 or 1,353.7 billion YER($3.1 or $6.7 billion) lower compared with urban 
households with lower incomes of 531.1 or 519.9 billion YER ($2.6 billion or $2.5 billion). Whereas farm households benefit 
from increasing yields that result from local climate change in the MIROC scenario, rural nonfarm households suffer both in 
relative and absolute terms in the MIROC and CSIRO scenarios. This household group is projected to lose an accumulated 711.0 
or 1,147.7 billion YER ($3.5 or $5.7 billion) as a consequence of climate change by 2050. 
Figure 3.11—Impacts of combined local and global changes on household incomes 
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Climate change also raises the number of hungry people in Yemen. By 2050, between 80,000 and 
270,000 people could go hungry due to climate change (Figure 3.12). Even under perfect mitigation, the 
number of hungry people is projected to rise, which can be explained mainly by rising global food prices 
caused by global increases in demand. 
                                                       
10 All dollars are U.S. dollars.  
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Figure 3.12—Impact of climate change on food security 
 
Source: Yemen Combined DCGE and Nutrition Model. 
Rural households are harder hit than urban households, and among the rural households the 
nonfarm households suffer most (Table 3.8). The negative effect on rural nonfarm households is 
explained through two major channels. Unlike farm households, rural nonfarm households do not benefit 
from higher prices for agricultural goods. At the same time, they spend the highest share of their income 
on food of all household groups, which makes them particularly vulnerable to food price changes. Urban 
households in contrast spend a lesser share of their income on food and derive most of their income from 
sectors that are largely unaffected by climate change. 
Table 3.8—Impact of climate change on food security 
      Change in hungry people (in 1,000s) 
   Initial  2030  2050 
Global change          
      Rural farm  1,836.1  67.7  93.0 
      Rural nonfarm  4,541.2  93.3  213.7 
      Urban  1,106.1  39.1  6.6 
      Total  7,483.3  200.1  313.3 
Climate change (MIROC)         
      Rural farm  1,836.1  -21.2  -14.8 
      Rural nonfarm  4,541.2  16.1  89.7 
      Urban  1,106.1  64.7  8.0 
      Total  7,483.3  59.6  82.8 
Climate change (CSIRO)         
      Rural farm  1,836.1  0.0  39.5 
      Rural nonfarm  4,541.2  23.3  218.1 
      Urban  1,106.1  50.5  8.0 
      Total  7,483.3  73.8  265.6 
Source: Yemen Combined DCGE and Nutrition Model. 
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4.  ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF FLOODS IN YEMEN 
Yemen is a disaster-prone country that faces a number of natural hazards every year with floods 
constituting the most important and recurring form of disaster in the country.
11 Whereas regular flooding 
has traditionally been beneficial for agricultural practices in Yemen, high-magnitude flooding often leads 
to losses of cropland, uprooting of fruit trees, death of animals caught in high floodwater surges, and 
destruction of infrastructure, such as irrigation facilities and rural roads. The damages done by floods tend 
to be exacerbated by an ongoing desertification process and land degradation. In addition, several GCMs 
predict higher rainfall levels for Yemen, thus potentially increasing the frequency and severity of floods 
in the future. 
Experience from the October 2008 tropical storm and flood confirms that the impact of such a 
disaster often reaches beyond the affected regions, the agricultural sector, and the rural population in 
Yemen. A recent joint assessment by the Government of Yemen and several international organizations 
suggests that the floods have been especially damaging for farmers and herders in the Wadi Hadramout 
and to a lesser extent in the Sahel Hadramout and the Al-Mahara governorate, while affecting nonfarm 
households through higher prices and thus reductions in real incomes (GY/WB/UNISDR/IFRCC 2009). 
Whereas the immediate local flood impacts in Yemen are well known, the potential size of flood impacts 
in terms of overall and agricultural GDP losses and the impacts on hunger are less well understood. 
Quantifying the impacts of flooding is important for designing appropriate mitigation strategies. 
This may become even more important in the future given that global climate change may increase the 
severity and frequency of extreme weather events (Salinger 2005). However, conducting flood impact 
assessments is complicated by the complex nature of the impacts and the availability of data. Isolating 
flood effects can be challenging and if data are incomplete it may not always be possible to assess both 
the direct and indirect effects, which is why computable general equilibrium models have become an 
increasingly popular tool for disaster impact assessments (Pauw et al. 2011). Within the CGE literature, 
the most common analyses are ex ante—to assess the impacts of hypothetical events (see, for example, 
Boyd and Ibarraran 2009)—and ex post—to evaluate the impacts of historical events (for example, 
Horridge, Madden, and Wittwer 2005). 
This flood impact assessment uses the DCGE model presented above to assess the potential 
impacts of floods in Yemen. We use an ex ante approach by using historical data from the 2008 
Hadramout flood to quantify the economywide repercussions and impacts on hunger incurred by the 
losses of cropland, fruit trees, and livestock and the changes in fishery yields over a period of five years 
(Table 4.1). This approach allows for looking beyond the reductions in regional agricultural production 
and also for isolating the impacts on the broader economy and households. In the following, we first 
provide a short description of past floods in Yemen, then introduce the DCGE simulation design by 
analyzing crop and livestock changes during and after the October 2008 flood, and finally present model 
results. 
According to the Emergency Events Database of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED, www.emdat.be/), approximately 100,000 people are affected annually by disasters 
triggered by natural hazards in Yemen. Over the past two decades, Yemen has become increasingly 
vulnerable to natural disasters, mainly due to high population growth, largely uncontrolled urbanization, 
and lack of environmental controls. In addition, the concentration of physical assets and vulnerable 
population in high-risk areas has led to an increased exposure to adverse natural events. 
   
                                                       
11 The top-four natural disasters in Yemen for the period 1990–2011 with regard to economic damages were all floods; see 
http://www.emdat.be/database.   
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Table 4.1—Human toll and damages due to floods and flash floods, 1993–2008 
Year   Month  Type 
Duration 




1993  February  Flood  5  Lahej, Abyan, Aden  31  21,500  1.5 
1996  May  Flood  4  Taiz, Hodeida  7  5,000  10 
  June  Flood  12  Shabwa, Mareb, Hadramout  338  238,210  1,200 
1998  August 
Flash 
flood  16  Shihab Valley, Red Sea Port  70  240  NA 
  March  Flood  3  Tihama Valley, Hodeidah    3,000  NA 
1999    Flood    Socotra archipelago    19,750  NA 
2002  August  Flood  1  Hodeidah, Taiz, Hadramout  28 
700 
NA 
  July  Flood  2  Raima  13  NA 
  July  Flood  2  Salafiyah  10  NA 
  April  Flood    Salafiyah, Hadramout  2  NA 
2003  June  Flood  3  Haija, Taiz  15    NA 
2005  August 
Flash 
flood  1    12  721  NA 
  April 
Flash 
flood  3  Sanaa, Hodeidah  10  NA 
2006  April 
Flash 
flood  2  Dhamar, Hodeidah, Manakha  25  320  NA 
  February 
Flash 
flood  3  Dhamar, Maabar  5  2,000  NA 
2007  August  Flood      50    NA 
  Mach 
Flash 
flood  3  Hadramout, Ibb  36  618  NA 
  January  Flood  3  Raima, Dhamar  7  2,000  NA 
2008  October 
Flash 
flood  2  Hadramout, Al-Mahara  75  25,000  1,235 
Source: GY/WB/UNISDR/IFRCC (2009). 
Floods are the most important and recurring disaster in Yemen. Over the last two decades and 
since the unification of the Arab Republic of Yemen and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 
May 1990, Yemen suffered through 19 floods or flash floods. CRED’s International Disaster Database 
(www.emdat.be/) ranked floods as the top four natural disasters in Yemen since 1990 with regard to 
economic damages. Floods also rank prominently with regard to killed persons (eight of the top 10 are 
floods) and affected people (nine of the top 10 are floods). 
The following impact assessment quantifies the agricultural, economywide, and nutritional 
impacts of floods in Yemen and focuses on the October 2008 Tropical Storm 03B, for which a joint 
assessment of the Government of Yemen, the World Bank, the United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction, and the International Federation of the Red Crescent and Cross serves as the basis 
(GY/WB/UNISDR/IFRCC 2009). This storm caused severe rain and flooding over the eastern parts of 
Yemen for about 30 hours, resulting in total rainfall of almost 91 millimeters (versus 5 to 6 millimeters 
during normal periods). The total catchment area of about 2 million hectares collected some 2 billion 
cubic meters of water. Given the topography of the affected area (mountainous terrain, rivers, and flat 
valleys), this large quantity of water in the catchment area led to severe flash floods in the valleys, with 
water surges reaching up to 18 meters in some areas. Moreover, the storm damaged boats and fishing 
equipment along the coastal line of the Arabian Sea. Overall, Tropical Storm 03B resulted in one of the 
largest natural disasters to hit Yemen in the last decade (GY/WB/UNISDR/IFRCC 2009). The heavy rain 
and flooding seriously affected the Hadramout and Al-Mahara governorates, which were declared disaster  
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areas on October 27, 2008. The Wadi Hadramout region (which is part of the Internal Plateau, or AEZ 5 
in the model) was hit the worst by the disaster, sustaining 67.5 percent of the total damage and losses. 
Hadramout’s coastal areas (called Sahel and included in AEZ 4 in the model) sustained 28.6 percent of 
total damage and losses, whereas Al-Mahara (parts of which are divided between zone 4 and zone 5) 
sustained 3.9 percent of the total (GY/WB/UNISDR/IFRCC 2009). 
Table 4.2 shows the changes in cropped area (as a result of soil erosion) and livestock numbers 
(goats and sheep, cattle, and camel killed by the high floodwater surge). These numbers serve as the base 
for implementing the flood shock in the DCGE model with the assumption that changes in cropland and 
livestock are entirely caused by the flood event. Moreover, we differentiate between immediate damages 
and longer-run losses of stocks. The damage estimates are based on quantities of the damaged assets such 
as planted and unplanted area for seasonal crops and livestock numbers. Losses refer to potential 
production losses from perennials and livestock spread over four years, reflecting that it takes time until 
replanted trees start bearing fruit and young animals produce meat and milk. 
Table 4.2—Changes in cropland, number of animals, and fishery yields during and after 
Hadramout flash flood by agroecological zone 
      Base year stocks  Damages  Losses 
      2007  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013 
    Yemen   Internal Plateau (Zone 5) 
Cropped area (acres)  1,480,000  -81.6  7.7  56.1  24.0  22.6 
Sheep and goats (head)  17,003,000  -3.4  -1.6  -1.0  6.2  0.0 
Cattle (head)    1,495,000  -1.4  1.0  -0.2  0.2  0.4 
Camel 
(head)    366,000  -6.3  4.8  -0.6  0.6  0.0 
      Arabian Sea Coast (Zone 4) 
Cropped area (acres)    -39.3  3.7  27.0  11.5  10.9 
Sheep and goats (head)    -0.8  0.6  -0.8  1.0  0.0 
Cattle (head)      -1.6  1.3  -1.6  2.1  0.0 
Camel 
(head)      -3.2  2.8  -3.4  4.4  0.0 
Fish (real value-added)    -6.7  5.7  -7.0  9.1  0.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on GY/WB/UNISDR/IFRCC (2009). 
Agricultural activities of the Internal Plateau (zone 5) and the Arabian Sea Coast (zone 4) 
together contribute about 7 percent to total agricultural value-added in Yemen, whereas agriculture makes 
up about 8.5 percent of the country’s GDP (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Thus, any supply-side shock affecting 
agriculture in these zones will have only a modest impact on national GDP but may have a substantial 
effect on the local economy. Yet this does not mean that income losses are confined to those engaged in 
agriculture in the flood area. In fact, between 26 and 20 percent of total annual income losses occur 
outside the affected zones’ agricultural sectors. The flood drastically changes the factor endowments in 
zones 4 and 5 with spillover effects to national goods and factor markets. Aggregate private consumption 
is reduced, driven by a loss of real incomes both through higher prices and the loss of income from land, 
capital, and labor. Demand for imports increases, especially for agricultural goods and food processing to 
substitute for previously domestically produced goods. Imported food and domestically produced food are 
not perfect substitutes, which leads to an increase in domestic food prices, albeit at lower levels than 
would be the case without international trade. Higher inflation leads to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, which discriminates against exports, and together with increasing imports leads to a  
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worsening of the trade balance. Investment picks up over the whole period, reflecting the necessity to 
replace stocks that have been lost during the flood. 
Real income losses in zone 5’s agricultural sector range between 6.6 and 4.3 billion YER 
annually ($33 and $22 million) during and in the aftermath of the flood; the losses are much lower in zone 
4’s agriculture (between 0.6 and 0.1 billion YER). The total cumulated real income loss over a period of 
five years amounts to 180 percent of preflood regional agricultural value-added. Annual real income 
losses are slightly lower in total agriculture as lower wages in zone 5 induce outmigration into other 
zones’ agricultural sectors. Moreover, total real GDP losses range between 10 and 6 billion YER, driven 
by general equilibrium repercussions resulting from losses of incomes in affected zones and higher prices. 
Figure 4.1 shows that the flood leads to a sharp reduction in zone 5’s growth rate and economic 
output, while the reduction is much lower in zone 4. Although both indicators (growth and annual real 
value-added) in both regions decline in the first year relative to a situation without flood, the growth rates 
pick up more quickly than economic output. In fact, this phenomenon is common for all kinds of 
economic shocks: during initial phases, the decline in growth is sharpest, since even when economic 
output in subsequent years is as low as in the initial phase the growth rate remains flat. However, relative 
to a situation without the flood, output remains lower throughout the whole period. In fact, growth in both 
zones returns to preflood levels after two years, yet annual output only slowly catches up with levels that 
had been achieved without flood. 
Figure 4.1—Loss in regional agricultural and overall GDP from flood 
 
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Agriculture is the sector hardest hit by flood, whereas the industrial and the service sectors are 
relatively more resilient (Figure 4.2). The loss in cropland and animals and the yield reductions in 
fisheries caused by the destruction of boats and fisheries equipment cannot be compensated for by the 
resulting higher prices of agricultural commodities and so lead to a contraction in agricultural GDP 
growth. In the year of the flood, the service sector also contracts slightly due to a fall in aggregate 
demand. However, model results suggest that industrial sectors—with the exception of food processing, 
which contracts slightly during the flood year and expands slightly afterward—are hardly affected by the 
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agricultural and fishing activities seeking jobs in other sectors. This lowers the economywide wage rates, 
especially for low-skilled labor. Industrial and service sectors that use this type of labor extensively 
benefit from the lower labor costs and so become more competitive. 
Figure 4.2—Flood impacts on GDP by sector 
   
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
Within agricultural subsectors, fruits are the hardest hit by the flood, followed by sesame and 
tomatoes (Figure 4.3). Fruits make up about 45 percent of zone 5’s value-added (but only 1.5 percent in 
zone 4)—followed by goats and sheep (about 20 percent), tomatoes (10 percent), vegetables and camel 
(each about 7 percent), and sesame (3 percent)—and given their high land intensity, fruit crops suffer 
more than other farm activities from the loss of soils and the uprooting of fruit trees. This is especially so 
during the flood year where value-added for fruits falls by 11 percent from 2007 to 2008. Other crop 
activities, fishing, and total livestock also fall during the flood but regain growth momentum over the 
longer run with the rehabilitation of agricultural land, replanting of fruit trees, restructuring of fishing 
infrastructure, and animal rearing. In contrast, camel production benefits from the flood. The reason is 
that camel production is the most export-oriented agricultural sector in Yemen; 70 percent of production 
is exported. As a result, the domestic producer price for camel is largely determined at the world market. 
Moreover, the sector uses low-skilled labor very intensively. Thus, although the sector is hurt by the real 
exchange rate appreciation in the base run, lower wages for unskilled labor accompanying the change in 
Yemen’s factor endowment actually lead to lower real producer wages in camel production and provide 
an incentive to expand production, despite decreasing animal stocks. Yet this result has to be interpreted 
cautiously as the model assumes high factor substitution elasticities between, for example, camel stocks 
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Figure 4.3—Loss in agricultural GDP from flood by subsector 
 
Source: Yemen DCGE Model. 
The countrywide hunger impacts of the flood are minor; however, there are substantial 
consequences at the local level and particularly among farmers in the Internal Plateau zone. Under the 
simulated flood scenario, the prevalence of hunger in Yemen’s rural areas and among all Yemeni farmers 
rises by less than one percentage point compared to the baseline level (Figure 4.4). Yet, on the local level, 
the consequences are severe, especially in the areas that are directly affected by the flood. The rural 
population and especially farmers in the Internal Plateau zone are hardest hit and, to a lesser extent, the 
rural population in the neighboring Arabian Sea and Desert zones. In the Internal Plateau, the percentage 
of hungry people living from farming surges by about 15 percentage points compared to a situation with 
no flood. This contributes to an increase in the overall prevalence of hunger in this zone by more than 2 
percentage points in the years after the flood. Moreover, the consequences for food security are long-
lasting in the flooded areas. During the four years after the flood year, the prevalence of hunger among 
farming households in the Internal Plateau remains high and declines by only less than 4 percentage 
points, leaving still 11 percent more suffering from hunger in the fifth year after the flood compared to the 
baseline level. In contrast, recovery in the less, or only indirectly, affected areas such as in the Arabian 
Sea zone is faster so that the hunger prevalence almost returns to its pre-flood levels four years after the 
flood occurrence. 
The pace of the recovery process depends on the structure of the local economy and the 
characteristics of the main economic activities in addition to the compensation measures and 
reconstruction efforts to be undertaken. Farm incomes and thus farmers’ food security are expected to be 
compromised over several years mainly due to the time required for the reconstruction of destroyed 
infrastructure and the rehabiliation of cropland and agricultural productivity. Given that many farmers 
earn large shares of their income from (perennial) fruit tree cultivation and as it takes several years until 
replanted fruit trees start bearing fruit, income losses and food insecurity extend over several years. The 
negative medium-term impacts on household income and food insecurity can be minimized if farmers can 
replace the destroyed fruit trees with modern varieties of seedlings for fruit trees that start bearing fruit 
sooner than the traditional varieties. Nonetheless, investments for reconstruction in the areas damaged by 
the flood may also create income earning opportunities and generate a development push, which, 
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Figure 4.4—Percentage change in the prevalence of hunger due to the floods 
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5.  SUMMARY AND PROPOSED ACTIONS FOR ADAPTATION 
This paper has assessed the impacts of climate change on Yemen’s economy, agriculture, and households 
from both a global and local perspective. Global climate change’s major impact channel is through 
changing world food prices, especially since Yemen is a net importer of many food commodities. Local 
climate change manifests itself through long-term yield changes. Even under perfect climate change 
mitigation, world market prices for food are projected to increase, posing food security challenges 
especially for poor households in a net food-importing country. Climate change results in additional 
world market price increases. The direction of predicted yield changes is less clear cut. Yields for wheat 
and maize are expected to fall in most of Yemen’s AEZs under both climate scenarios. Yields for 
sorghum and millet are expected to rise in some zones and fall in others under the CSIRO scenario, 
whereas they are expected to rise considerably across all zones under the MIROC scenario as a result of 
higher predicted rainfall. 
Our results suggest that climate-change-induced higher global prices for food will slightly lower 
Yemen’s overall GDP growth, raise agricultural GDP, and decrease real household incomes. Effects on 
agricultural GDP vary by AEZ depending on production structure. Whereas producers in zone 3 benefit 
disproportionately from rises in prices for a range of commodities such as fruits and vegetables, 
agricultural GDP in zone 4 does not change at all. Real incomes decline in all household groups. Rural 
nonfarm households are hit hardest as they tend to be net food consumers with high food budget shares. 
Farm households also experience real income losses given that many of them are net buyers of food. 
Local impacts of climate change are different for the two climate scenarios. Under the MIROC 
scenario, agricultural GDP is somewhat higher than under perfect mitigation. Rural incomes rise due to 
higher yields and lower prices for sorghum and millet, whereas urban households are largely unaffected 
because they hardly consume those commodities. Again, producers in zone 3 are the main beneficiaries 
because in that zone sorghum and millet account for a larger share of agricultural value-added than in any 
other zone. Under the CSIRO scenario, positive and negative yield changes cancel each other out. As a 
result, agricultural GDP and incomes for all three household groups hardly change compared with perfect 
mitigation. 
The long-term implications of climate change (local and global) lead to a total reduction of 
household welfare of 1,161.2 or 1,873.6 billion YER ($5.7 or $9.2 billion) by 2050 under MIROC or 
CSIRO conditions, respectively. Those reductions in welfare accumulate over time. In 2020, household 
incomes are projected to be 63.8 or 82.0 billion YER ($314.4 or $404.2 million) lower compared with a 
perfect mitigation scenario, and those losses increase to 269.6 or 366.8 billion YER ($1.3 or $1.8 billion) 
by 2030. Rural households suffer more from climate change than urban households. By 2050, rural 
household incomes are 630.1 or 1,353.7 billion YER ($3.1 or $6.7 billion) lower versus those of urban 
households, which are 531.1 or 519.9 billion YER ($2.6 to $2.6 billion) lower. Whereas farm households 
benefit from increasing yields that result from local climate change in the MIROC scenario, rural nonfarm 
households suffer both in relative and absolute terms in the MIROC and CSIRO scenarios. This 
household group is projected to lose an accumulated 711.0 or 1,147.7 billion YER ($3.5 or $5.7 billion) 
as a consequence of climate change by 2050. 
In addition to the longer-term climate change effects, climate variability may also induce heavy 
economic losses and spikes in food insecurity and hunger. For example, the impact assessment of the 
October 2008 tropical storm and floods in the Wadi Hadramout shows that agriculture in Yemen is the 
sector hardest hit by floods, whereas the industry and the service sectors are relatively more resilient. 
Estimates put the total cumulated real income loss over the period 2008–2012 at 180 percent of preflood 
regional agricultural value-added. Due to the direct flood losses, farmers in the flooding areas suffer most 
in the year of the flood occurrence, where the percentage of hungry people living from farming spiked by 
about 15 percent as an immediate result of the flood. Regional spillover effects lead to increases in hunger 
even in regions where the flood has no direct impact. In the neighboring Arabian Sea Coast and Desert  
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AEZs, the percentage of hungry people in rural areas still increases by more than 1 percent due to the 
flood. 
Given that global climate change is likely to become the main driver of household income losses 
and rising food insecurity, successful global climate negotiations that help mitigate the upward pressure 
on world food prices are crucial for Yemen’s future development. As concerns domestic policy, farm 
households could over time increasingly benefit from the predicted price increases if more of them had 
better access to markets and efficient supply chains. However, the National Food Security Strategy 
acknowledges that the potential for accelerated agricultural growth is constrained by Yemen’s severe 
scarcity of water and arable land, but at the same time it outlines several options for raising agricultural 
productivity and food security among farm households. Those include investments in water-saving 
technologies, incentives that encourage the use of more water-efficient crops, and investments to promote 
agricultural alternatives such as coffee. 
The bulk of the adaptation to climate change would, however, have to come from the 
nonagricultural sector. Policymakers can facilitate private-sector-led growth in various ways, such as 
through improved access to credit and a more investment-friendly tax regime. Since rural nonfarm 
households are hardest hit by rising food prices while already exhibiting the highest initial levels of food 
insecurity, investments that generate rural nonfarm employment in sectors such as food processing and 
tourism should in particular be encouraged, such as by investing in rural infrastructure. Better 
opportunities for private investors in rural areas would have to be complemented by transfers aimed at the 
most food-insecure households. 
The main challenge arising from climate variability is that the projected increase in rainfall may 
raise the risk of floods in the future, which can have devastating effects as the recent Hadramout flood 
forcefully illustrates. Dealing with recurrent floods requires a comprehensive disaster risk management 
strategy.
12 Such a strategy would have to consist of a broad set of measures, including the provision of 
effective short-run emergency assistance for those who suffer the most severe damage, longer-term 
investments in risk reduction such as the establishment of flood protection systems and the upgrading of 
roads, and institutional capacity building to ensure that plans are implemented in a coordinated way. 
   
                                                       
12 For a detailed outline of a disaster risk management strategy, see the joint assessment of the 2008 floods by the 
Government of Yemen, the World Bank, the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, and the International 
Federation for the Red Crescent and Cross (2009).  
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES 
Table A.1—Mathematical presentation of the Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model—
core model equations 
Production function 
fc
fct f ct ct F Q
δ α ∏ ⋅ =   (1) 
Factor payments 
ct ct fc c fct c ft Q P F W ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ∑ ∑ δ   (2) 
Import supply  0 ≥ ⊥ ⋅ ≤ ct
m
c t ct M W E P   (3) 
Export demand  0 ≥ ⊥ ⋅ ≥ ct
e
c t ct X W E P   (4) 
Household income 
t h fct ft hf fc ht E r F W Y ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ =∑ θ   (5) 
Consumption demand  ( ) ht h hc hct ct Y v D P ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ 1 β   (6) 
Investment demand  ( ) b E Y I P
t ht h h c ct ct v + ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ∑ ρ   (7) 




c + + ⋅ = ⋅ ∑   (8) 
Product market equilibrium 
ct ct hct h ct ct X I D M Q + + = + ∑   (9) 
Factor market equilibrium 
ft fct c s F = ∑   (10) 
Land and labor expansion  ( ) f t ft s s ϕ + ⋅ = − 1 1   f is land and labor  (11) 











+ − ⋅ = ∑ η   f is capital  (12) 
Technical change  ( ) c ct ct y + ⋅ = − 1 1 α α   (13) 
Notes:     
Subscripts  Exogenous variables   
c  Commodities or economic sectors  b  Foreign savings balance (foreign currency units) 
f  Factor groups (land, labor, and capital)  r  Foreign remittances 
h  Household groups  s  Total factor supply 
t  Time periods  w  World import and export prices 
Endogenous variables    Exogenous parameters   
D  Household consumption demand quantity  α  Production shift parameter (factor productivity) 
E  Exchange (local/foreign currency units)  β  Household average budget share 
F  Factor demand quantity  γ  Hicks neutral rate of technical change 
I  Investment demand quantity  δ  Factor input share parameter 
M  Import supply quantity  η  Capital depreciation rate 
P  Commodity price  θ  Household share of factor income 
Q  Output quantity  κ  Base price per unit of capital stock 
W  Average factor return  ρ  Investment commodity expenditure share 
X  Export demand quantity  υ  Household marginal propensity to save 
Y  Total household income  φ  Land and labor supply growth rate 
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
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Table A.2—Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) disaggregation 
Activities and 
commodities  Factors  Institutions 
Sorghum  Private sector, unskilled  Enterprises 
Maize  Private sector, semiskilled  Rural farm households 
Millet  Private sector, skilled  Rural nonfarm households 
Wheat  Public sector, unskilled  Urban households 
Barley  Public sector, semiskilled   
Other grains  Public sector, skilled  Other 
Fruits  Capital  Government 
Potatos  Land  Direct taxes 
Vegetables  Livestock  Sales taxes 
Pulses    Import tariffs 
Coffee    Savings-investment 
Sesame    Rest of world 
Cotton     
Qat     
Tobacco     
Camels     
Cattle     
Chicken     
Goats and sheep     
Fish     
Forestry     
Mining     
Food processing     
Industry     
Electricity and water     
Services      
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
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Table A.3—Macro Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
   Activities  Commodities  Factors  Households  Government  Rest of world  Sav-inv.  Inst. tax  Import tariffs  Ind. tax  Total 
Activities    7856.6                  7856.6 
Commodities  2767.5      3201.1  854.1  1414.9  1377.9        9615.5 
Factors  5089.1                    5089.1 
Households      5089.1    -812.0  104.0          4381.1 
Government            213.4    204.6  44.4  -279.4  183.0 
Rest of world    1993.9                  1993.9 
Sav-inv.        975.4  140.9  261.6          1377.9 
Inst. tax        204.6              204.6 
Import tariffs    44.4                  44.4 
Ind. tax    -279.4                  -279.4 
Total  7856.6  9615.5  5089.1  4381.1  183.0  1993.9  1377.9  204.6  44.4  -279.4    
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Table A.4—Income elasticities estimated for the Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Model 
   Sorghum  Maize  Millet  Wheat  Barley  Other grains  Fruits  Potatos  Vege tables 
Rural farm  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.31  1.58  0.4  0.62 
Rural nonfarm  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.31  0.31  1.58  0.4  0.62 
Urban  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.28  1.39  0.4  0.57 
   Pulses  Coffee  Sesame  Cotton  Qat  Tobacco  Camel  Cattle  Poultry 
Rural farm  0.62  1.11  0.62  1.31  1.25  1.11  1.02  1.02  1.02 
Rural nonfarm  0.62  1.11  0.62  1.31  1.25  1.11  1.02  1.02  1.02 
Urban  0.57  0.81  0.57  1.14  0.93  0.81  0.49  0.49  0.49 
  
Goats and 




industry  Utilities  Services   
Rural farm  1.02  1.02  0.38  1.95  1.02  1.72  0.98  2.18   
Rural nonfarm  1.02  1.02  0.38  1.95  1.02  1.72  0.98  2.18   
Urban  0.49  0.49  0.28  1.79  0.49  1.51  0.43  1.55   
Source: Authors’ compilation.  
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Table A.5—Determinants of per capita calorie consumption 
Variable  Coefficient significance  Standard 
error 
Log of expenditure  0.857 ***  0.045 
Log of expenditure squared  -0.057 ***  0.004 
Log of household size  0.209 ***  0.024 
Log of household size, squared  -0.061 ***  0.006 
Children  -0.186 ***  0.012 
Dependency ratio  -0.074 ***  0.007 
Adult man  0.042 ***  0.016 
Adult woman  0.077 ***  0.026 
Adult gender ration  -0.020 ***  0.005 
Log of household head’s age  0.380 ***  0.139 
Log of household head’s age, squared  -0.056 ***  0.019 
School attendance of household head  0.061   0.305 
Education level of household head  -0.024 ***  0.003 
Qat consumption  -0.051 ***  0.012 
Share of qat expenditure on total expenditure  -0.014 ***  0.004 
Self-sufficiency level  0.122 ***  0.025 
Constant  3.852 ***  0.421 
Observations        12, 093 
F-value      69.76 
R-squared      0.271 
Adjusted R-squared        0.267 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Note: ***, **, * indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  
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APPENDIX B: IMPACT AND SAM CROP ACTIVITY MAPPING 
Table B.1—IMPACT and SAM Crop Activity Mapping 
IMPACT crops  DCGE model traded agricultural sectors 
Wheat  Wheat 
Maize  Maize 
Other grains  Other grains 
Fruits  Fruits 
Vegetables  Vegetables 
Vegetables  Potatoes 
Vegetables  Pulses 
Cotton  Cotton 
Lamb  Goats and sheep 
Beef  Cattle 
Poultry  Chicken 
Source: IFPRI IMPACT and Authors’ compilation. 
Notes: IMPACT = International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade; SAM = Social Accounting 
Matrix; DCGE = Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium. 
Other grains: Other grains were represented by rice and maize. 
Fruits, potatoes, pulses: Figures for these were those projected for vegetables. 
Sheep: Figures for sheep were assumed to equal figures from lamb.  
Cattle: Figures for cattle were assumed to follow projections of beef 
Chicken: The projections for poultry represented projections for chicken. 
Given that not all of the disaggregated agricultural sector activity was produced on a one-to-one 
basis from the International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade 
(IMPACT), certain assumptions were made in order to map the sectors needed in the model to their 
equivalent in IMPACT. The only crops that received a one-to-one mapping were wheat, maize, and 
cotton.  
41 
APPENDIX C: TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL CHANGES BY  
AGROECOLOGICAL ZONE 
Figure C.1—Lower Highlands: Monthly temperature highs and lows 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
Figure C.2—Upper Highlands: Temperature highs and lows 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
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Figure C.3—Arabian Sea: Temperature highs and lows 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
Figure C.4—Desert: Temperature highs and lows 
. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
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Figure C.5—Internal Plateau: Temperature highs and lows 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
Figure C.6—Red Sea and Tihama: Temperature highs and lows 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
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Figure C.7—Lower Highlands: Average monthly rain 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
Figure C.8—Upper Highlands: Average monthly rain 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
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Figure C.9—Arabian Sea: Average monthly rain 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
Figure C.10—Desert: Average monthly rain 
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Figure C.11—Internal Plateau: Average monthly rain 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Jones et al (2010). 
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